In the bilateral trading model developed by Myerson [1], an ex post efficient mechanism that satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality has been proved to be not existed. This paper is aimed at the discussion of modified bilateral trading model where the buyer and seller's valuations for the object are assumed to be not independent. Under such assumption, we concern about the existence of an ex post efficient mechanism satisfying individual compatible and individual rational conditions. We will give a necessary condition of such mechanism, not precisely though, to identify the existence. At the end of this paper, we provide some empirical evidences about the non-independent assumption and suggest some directions for further research, both empirical and theoretical.
Introduction
Uncertainty and asymmetric information have been under central discussion in mechanism design and auction theories. Many theories have been put forward to model the behavior of market or mechanism under asymmetric information, which can be traced back to the research in Lemon market and adverse selection of job market [2] [3] . One classic model among asymmetric information models is principal-agent model [4] . Bilateral trading model can be treated as a special case of principal-agent model, and can be analyzed by the frame of it. One of the most important ideas of principal-agent model is to indicate that under asymmetric information, principal should pay extra money in order to make every agent report his type honestly and willing to participate in the game. The extra cost is evaluated as information rent. But cases are not totally the same in bilateral trading model. The difference lies in that there is no principal, and we only need to design a mechanism or a tariff to ensure each player is willing to participate in and the mechanism exhibits desirable features in maximizing the net utility of both players. Such normal mechanism is characterized in terms of individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and ex post efficiency. We shall explain them later.
In Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism design, the optimal auction mechanism is clear for a class of distribution where agents types are independently and identically distributed, which has been proved in references [5] and [6] . Independent distribution serves a central condition for the computation of agents' virtual payoff.
Previous research about bilateral trading problem ( [7] [8]) or optimal auction design showed the impossibility of designing a mechanism that is individual rational, incentive compatible and ex post efficient without outside subsidy. Individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and ex post efficiency are important criterion for a well designed mechanism. If a mechanism is not individual rational, the market will crash since players cannot receive positive expected utility.
If a mechanism is not incentive compatible, the players won't honestly report their real type. If a mechanism is not ex post efficient, there would be some situations where trade determined by the mechanism such that each player must attain negative utility. The key element that causes such outcome is the assump- , f v v . The utility of the seller is v 2 -x and the utility of the buyer is x-v 1 if the mechanism specifies x as the executing price.
According to an essential result of bargain game called revelation principle, a mechanism can be determined by two functions: ( )
, p v v if the mechanism is a direct bargaining mechanism.
( ) The difference lies in the definition domain of ( )
, p v v is now on the area D.
Given any equilibrium of any bargain game, there exist an equivalent incentive-compatible direct mechanism by first asking the buyer and seller each to confidentially report his valuation, then determine the corresponding ( )
, p v v by computing according to original mechanism. When we are analyzing bilateral trading mechanism, we only consider such direct mechanism.
We need to define some new variables in order to get the expected utility of buyer and seller. But before giving the specific definition, we need to do some technical work.
The following figure shows an example of such a rectangle. Then we extend the definition domain of ( )
then f, p, x equal to 0. We use the extended f, p, x in the following discussion.
As is shown in Figure 1 , the smallest rectangle R containing D is
We denote the red curve as L, which is a part of D's boundary and is tangent to line:
2 y a = and line:
After the above technical works, the buyer and seller's conditional expectation of x, p and their final utility can be written as: ( )
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The U 1 , U 2 defined above is the expected total utility gain from the trade. Thus their economic meanings are well defined. We may call
, h v h v : the generalized density function of each individual.
Individual Rationality and Incentive Compatibility
We first review the definition of incentive compatibility and individual rationality.
Incentive compatibility:
A mechanism (p, x) is individual compatible iff for any v 1 and 1
And for any v 2 and 2
The economic interpretation of incentive compatibility is that each of the players can maximize their expected utility by reporting their type honestly, rather than telling a lie.
We can derive that any incentive compatible mechanism must satisfy:
The above relations are natural expansion of the classic results developed in optimal auction design and VCG mechanism design [1] .
Individual rationality:
Also known as participating constraint, Individual rationality requires that, in a game, each player has positive expected utility:
If a mechanism is individual rational, players will obtain non-negative expected utility by participating the game.
Here is the main result of the generalized model: 
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The Existence of an Ex Post Efficient Mechanism
Indeed, an incentive compatible and individual rational mechanism is desirable for practical usage. But in order to consider the efficiency of a mechanism, we need to consider one more property, which is ex post efficiency. In general, even if a mechanism is incentive compatible and individual rational, the inefficient case where the valuation 1 2 v v > but the mechanism still tells that a trade should be made may appear, which will cause each player becoming worse off.
First, we define another concept that may help us to measure the efficiency of a mechanism.
A mechanism is ex post efficient if and only if ( )
It has been proved that for the independent distributed valuation model de- 
is always negative, which contradicts individual rational condition.
We have identified a necessary condition for the existence of an incentive compatible, individual rational, and ex post efficient mechanism, but we also need some more accurate method to estimate the value of ( ) ( )
Take derivation of ( ) ( ) 1 
2
U x U y +
with respect to x and y. we can get the following equation. This relies on the assumption that D is a differentiable area.
We consider the first order condition:
which can be also written as: U x U y + and judge the existence of an incentive compatible, individual rational, and ex-post efficient mechanism by the sign of the minimum value.
This time, we cannot prove the non-existence theorem in reference [1] and [9] , because we can easily construct a special case to prove its existence. Although the area doesn't satisfy the convex and differentiable assumption, the example is indeed the simplest way to construct such a special case. Since the convex and differentiable assumptions are not substantially essential to our main result, we can release these assumptions temporary.
In the case shown in Figure 3 , the whole area D consists of two rectangles: D and S. 
Also, denote the corresponding "distribution" functions (not strict distribution functions because they don't satisfy: f v , which implies V 1 and V 2 are "locally" independent on D.
We need some new notations to state the special case in order.
( ) 
Then we can obtain the minimum utility: 
is Open Journal of Business and Management large enough. These conditions can be satisfied if we intend to construct such a density function.
We have proved that under generalized bilateral trading model, there may exist an incentive-compatible individual rational and ex-post efficient mechanism.
Anyway, the economic intuition about the generalized model should also be declared. Still, some empirical and further theoretical analyses are also needed to be made. There is another question: if we can buy the same thing at various market. It will be a dominant strategy to choose a market that has relative low expected valuation of the object. Under this assumption, the high-end market will crash and all buyers will purchase goods at low-end market or second-hand market, while this is obviously not the fact. Theoretically, finding the sufficient and necessary conditions of the existence of an incentive compatible, individual rational, and ex post efficient mechanism is still an unfinished work.
Further Interpretations
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper successfully generalizes the bilateral trading model by easing the restriction on the distribution, which now can be non-independent. The two main changes brought by the modification are: 1) the expression of the expected utility with respect to each player; 2) the changes in determining condition for individual rationality. These two changes make it possible for the existence of an incentive compatible, individual rational, and ex post efficient mechanism.
